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SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS IN WEST VIRGINIA
Although one authority has stated that an exact definition of
a spendthrift trust "seems neither possible nor useful"' the
definition in the Restatement of Trusts will be found of value as
a starting point for discussion of the problem. According to the
Restatement,
"A trust in which by the terms of the trust a valid re-
straint on the voluntary and involuntary transfer of the in-
terest of the beneficiary is imposed is a spendthrift trust." 2
It is obvious that this definition taken alone is of little value be-
cause the important question whether a particular restraint is
valid is left unanswered. However, this objection is met by the
I GRISWOLD, SPENDTHRnv TRUSTS (1936) 2.
2 RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS (1935) § 152 (2) (Italics supplied).
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Restatement definition of a valid restraint in this connection. It is
stated that, with certain exceptions,3
"..... if by the terms of a trust the beneficiary is entitled
to the income from the trust property for life or for a term
of years and it is provided that his interest shall not be trans-
ferable by him and shall not be subject to the claims of his
creditors, the restraint on the voluntary and involuntary
transfer of his right to the income accruing during his life is
valid. "4
Thus, if A transfers property to B in trust, the income to be paid
to C for life, and it is provided that 0 shall have no right to assign
his interest and that he shall enjoy the income free from the claims
of his creditors, ! is the beneficiary of a valid spendthrift trust.
The validity of such a trust has long been recognized in West
Virginia. In the leading case of Guernsey v. Lazear,5 Judge Bran-
non in a characteristically able opinion reviewed the decisions and
the arguments for and against the validity of such a restraint on
the alienation of an equitable interest and concluded that at com-
mon law such restraints were valid, the policy in favor of free
alienability of property being outweighed by the desirability of
allowing owners of property to provide protection for their friends
and relatives who may be unable to make provision for themselves.
However, although our court placed its decision largely on this
ground, and although most of the spendthrift trust cases which
have come before it have involved beneficiaries who either were
true spendthrifts or were persons like minors, mental incompetents
or widows lacking in business experience, all of whom may fairly
be said to need such protection, it should be noted that spendthrift
trusts are generally not limited to the protection of such persons
and that they "may be created equally well for the able-bodied
and thrifty and for those who could easily earn a living, manage
their own property, and pay their debts at maturity."'  Whether
our court, if left free to develop its own doctrine, would have placed
3 One exception, to be discussed later, is a case where the creator of the trust
is himself a beneficiary, RESTATELENT, TRUSTS § 156. The other exception
deals with claims against the beneficiary by particular classes of claimants, such
as claims by wife or child for support, and claims by persons who have sup-
plied the beneficiary with necessaries or who have rendered services or furnished
materials which preserve or benefit his interest in the trust. RESTATEMENT,
TRUSTS § 157. These and many other problems concerning spendthrift trusts
have not yet arisen in this state and are not discussed in this note.
4Id. § 152 (1).
5 51 W. Va. 328, 41 S. E. 405 (1902).
0 1 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES (1935) 721,
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any limitation on the use of spendthrift trusts, confining them
to the protection of true spendthrifts or others in actual need of
protection, is arguable, but .since 1931 when legislative sanction
was given to spendthrift trusts it is clear that no such limitation
may now be imposed by the court.
7
In reaching the decision in Guernsey v. Lazear that spendthrift
trusts are valid, the court had to dispose of a statutory provision
which in some states has been held to prohibit such trusts. Ac-
cording to the West Virginia Code then in effect,
"Estates of every kind, holden or possessed in trust, shall
be subject to debts and charges of the persons to whose use or
to whose benefit they are holden or possessed, as they would
be if those persons owned the like interest in the things holden
or possessed as in the uses or trusts thereof."s
This legislation was copied from Virginia which had held in Hutch-
inson v. Maxwell59 that this statute prevented the creation of an
equitable interest which could be enjoyed free from the claims of
creditors, the Virginia court refusing to follow a dictum in an
earlier case'0 that spendthrift trusts were valid. The West Vir-
ginia court placed a different construction on the statute and held
that it did not prohibit the creation of a spendthrift trust, pointing
out that prior to its enactment no equitable interests were subject
to debts and that this statute, procedural in nature, was passed in
order to make equitable interests in general liable, but that it had
no bearing on the question whether an equitable interest might be
created which would be inalienable and hence immune from
liability.11 The legislature subsequently approved this construction
TW. VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 18 provides: " .... where the
creator of the trust has expressly so provided in the instrument or conveyance
creating the trust, real or personal property may be held in trust upon condi-
tion that the income therefrom shall be applied by the trustee to the support
and maintenance of a beneficiary or beneficiaries of the trust in being at the
time of the creation of the trust, other than the creator of the trust, for the
life of such beneficiary or beneficiaries, without being subject to the liabilities
of, or alienation by, such beneficiary or beneficiaries." Although, as will be
seen by reference to the Revisers' Note, this purported to do no more than
codify existing decisions on the subject, it clearly permits the creation of a
spendthrift trust for the benefit of any person, which point may have been open
under the decisions themselves.
s W. VA. CODE (1868) c. 71, § 16.
9 100 Va. 169, 40 S. E. 655 (1902), 57 L. R. A. 384 (1903).
L Garland v. Garland, 87 Va. 758, 13 S. E. 478 (1891).
"1 Guernsey v. Lazear, 51 W. Va. 328, 339-340, 41 S. E. 405 (1902). For
further discussion of decisions dealing with similar statutes, see GRISWOLD,
SPzNDDTHw TRUSTS §§ 59-60.
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of the statute by adding thereto as an exception the present pro-
vision authorizing the creation of spendthrift trusts.12
It was stated in Guernsey v. Lazear that the doctrine of spend-
thrift trusts would be inapplicable to an equitable estate in fee.
This was expressly so held in a later case.13 It is also clear that
any attempt directly to restrain the alienation of a legal estate is
ineffectual. 14 However, the attempted restraint on alienation some-
times takes the form of a forfeiture upon alienation. While such
a forfeiture is valid if attached to a legal life estate, if attached to
a fee simple or to an absolute interest in personalty, it is void."
Probably no rule concerning spendthrift trusts is better estab-
lished than the rule that a settlor may not create such a trust for
himself, and that if he attempts to do so, his equitable interest is
alienable and may be reached by his creditors. 16 The West Virginia
court in Hoff n m v. Beltzhoover'7 by overlooking the rule that a
forfeiture upon alienation of a fee simple is void, upheld a spend-
thrift trust which in fact had been created by the settlor for his
own benefit. The facts of Hoffiman v. Beltzloover are unique. T
devised land to A in fee, with a provision that if A should sell the
land, "there shall remain in the hands of the purchaser and as a
lien upon said land the sum of Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars for
the sole use and support and for no other purpose, of the said ....
[A] during the term of his natural life,, and my Executor or his
successor, is hereby appointed and constituted a Trustee for the
collection of the interest accruing on the above twenty-five hundred
dollars in the hands of the purchaser of the said land, and I do
direct that no part of the principal of the twenty-five hundred
dollars shall be used for the support of the said .... [A] but the
interest only during his natural life.' 1 8 A sold the land to B, who
by a deed of trust created a lien on the land to secure the payment
to E in trust for A of the interest on the $2,500 during A's life and
12 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 18.
13 MeCreery v. Johnston, 90 W. Va. 80, 110 S. E. 464 (1922). See Comment
on this case, (1922) 31 YALE L. J. 759.
14 McClure v. Cook, 39 W. Va. 579, 20 S. E. 612 (1894) (life estate) ; Kerns
v. Carr, 82 W. Va. 78, 95 S. E. 606 (1918) (same); Bruceton Bank v. Alex-
ander, 83 W. Va. 573, 98 S. E. 804 (1919) (same); Deepwater Railway Com-
pany v. Honaker, 66 W. Va. 136, 66 S. E. 104 (1909) (fee simple); Cobb v.
Moore, 90 W. Va. 63, 110 S. E. 468 (1922) (same).
'5 GRAY, REsTRAiNTs ox ALIENATION (2d ed. 1895) Summary § 279.
16 GRIswOLD, SPENDTHRF TRusTs c. VII; RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS § 156.
17 71 W. Va. 72, 76 S. E. 968 (1912).
i Id, at 73.
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the payment at A's death of the principal as provided in T's will 0
A then assigned his interest under the trust to C. B filed a bill of
interpleader to determine whether he should pay the interest to A
or to C. It was held that A was the beneficiary of a valid spend-
thrift trust and that payment should be made to him.
To begin with, it is not at all clear that B had any right to
relief by a bill of interpleader. B's sole obligation was to pay to
E in trust for A. So far as B was concerned it was immaterial
whether A's assignment was valid. This point, however, was not
raised and the court did not mention it in the opinion. Of more
importance is a point which was raised, namely, that the clause of
the will which purported to create the trust was void because re-
pugnant to the fee, and hence that A, being owner in fee of the
land and not being subject to any valid restriction by reason of the
provision in the will, had in effect created the trust for his own
benefit.20 The court disposed of this argument in a summary
fashion, apparently without appreciating the real issue involved:
"The argument that the trust was created by the bene-
ficiary himself . :. . is not tenable. The testator created the
trust. We can not see it in any different light than if he had
directly created such trust in the first instance .... ,21
This, of course, assumes that the restriction in the will was valid,
whereas, it would appear to be too clear for argument that the
clause in question provided for a partial forfeiture of A's interest
in the land or of his interest in the proceeds to the extent of $2,500.
A being left with only a right to the income from the $2,500 for
life. Applying the rule that a forfeiture upon alienation, if at-
tached to a fee simple, or to an absolute interest in personalty, is
void, which is only another way of stating the argument of counsel
that the clause was void because repugnant to the fee, it necessarily
follows that A was the owner of the land free of all restrictions.
Hence, when he sold to B he furnished the consideration for the
trust, which in legal effect is the same as if he had created the
trust himself. In view of these considerations, it "seems unlikely
10 Although all of this does not clearly appear in the report of the case, it
may be found in the Record, p. 18, SUPREME COURT RECORDS AND BRIEFS,
Vol. 71-E.
20 Appellant2s Brief, pp. 5-8 and pp. 17-19, SUPREME COURT RECORDS AND
BRis, Vol. 71-E.
21 Hoffman v. Beltzhoover, 71 W. Va. 72, 75, 76 S. B. 968 (1912).
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that this case would be extended beyond its facts" '2 2 and it is even
doubtful that the court would follow it.
Even if the case should be followed it would only be authority
that such a restriction on a fee is valid and would not stand for
the proposition that one may create a spendthrift trut for his own
benefit. Although such would seem to be the actual holding, the
statute now in force expressly provides that the creator of a spend-
thrift trust may not be a beneficiary.2 3 Hoffman v. Beltzhoover is,
however, authority for the generally accepted rule that no par-
ticular form of words is necessary for the creation of a spendthrift
trust, it being sufficient that the terms of the trust as a whole mani-
fest the settlor's intention to create such a trust.2' Query whether
this rule has in any way been modified by our statute which pro-
vides that the interest of the beneficiary will not be subject to
claims of creditors and may not be aliened "where the creator of
the trust has expressly so provided in the instrument or convey-
ance creating the trust." 2'
It has already been mentioned that the Virginia court held
that the statute subjecting equitable interests to liability for debts
prohibited the creation of spendthrift trusts in that state. The
Virginia legislature subsequently authorized their creation in
cases where the principal of the trust does not exceed $100,000.-o
When our Code was revised in 1931 it was suggested that a similar
limitation be imposed in this state, but the legislature refused to
follow the suggestion.17  This is to be regretted. While admittedly
spendthrift trusts are socially desirable when they are used to pro-
vide a moderate income for persons who need their protection, they
become at best a mixed evil when used for any other purpose.
28
The question to what extent spendthrift trusts should be upheld is
purely one of policy, and it has been suggested that the proper
policy, and one which for the most part reconciles the arguments
for and against such trusts, is the adoption of legislation which
either directly limits the income which may be kept out of the
22This is Griswold's conclusion after detailed consideration of the case.
GRiswoLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS 224 and 425-427.
23 . VA. REv. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 18.
24And see Bruceton Bank v. Alexander, 83 W. Va. 573, 575, 98 S. E. 804
(1919). Cf. Talley v. Ferguson, 64 W. Va. 328, 62 S. E. 456 (1908).
25 W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 18 (Italics supplied).
28 VA. CODE (1919) § 5157.
27 Id. Revisers' Note and Committee's Note.
28 For arguments against the unrestrained use of spendthrift trusts, see
GRIswoLD, SPENDTHRaI TRuSTS § 555.
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reach of creditors as in New York,2" or, as in Virginia, indirectly
does so by limiting the principal which may be tied up in a spend-
thrift trust.8 0 Since, as has already been pointed out, it is no
longer possible for the court itself to guard against the abuses
which are inherent in the unrestrained use of spendthrift trusts by
imposing some such reasonable limitation, it is to be hoped that
the legislature may see fit to reconsider its refusal to limit their
use.
C. L. C.
29 In New York creditors may reach 10 per cent of the income of any trust
which exceeds $12 per week. CLEVENGER, PRACTICE MANUAL OF N. Y. (15th ed.
1937) Civil Practice Act § 684. They may also reach all the surplus income
beyond a sum necessary for the education and support of the beneficiary.
49 N. Y. CONsoL. LAws (McKinney, 1937) §§ 98, 103; 40 Id. § 15.
8o GRIswoLD, SPENDTHIFiT TRusTs § 556.
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